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In 1991, Darwin College Cambridge was given a substantial bequest to fund a research 
post in parapsychology. The event became something of a cause célebre. Various 
Cambridge University academics objected to accepting this money: the professor of 
philosophy, D.H. Mellor, said on BBC radio that funding such a position would be like 
funding a research post to determine whether the earth is round. Other members of 
Darwin College were (understandably, perhaps) reluctant to turn down any offer of 
money for research. In the end the situation was resolved to the satisfaction of the 
sceptics: Nicholas Humphrey, psychologist and broadcaster, was given the post to 
research into the reasons why people believe in parapsychology. The present book is one 
result. 
 Was the money well spent? Soul-Searching is a lively, entertaining book, packed 
with pointed quotations from literary and scientific sources. The actual upshot of 
Humphrey’s research comes as no surprise: the reason people believe in 
parapsychological phenomena is because they want to believe in them, because they want 
to think there is something more to human beings than just the matter which makes them 
up. Belief in parapsychology is, like belief in the immortality of the soul, wishful 
thinking deriving from our inability to accept the brute facts of our material existence. 
 This conclusion, though not in itself implausible, does not seem to be the product 
of extensive empirical research. Little of this book is the result of (say) interviews with 
parapsychologists, or opinion polls, and Humphrey does not even quote much from the 
works of parapsychologists. It is hard not to speculate that Humphrey knew what the 
outcome of his research would be even before he started.  
 However, this is not in itself a criticism of the book, since Humphrey sets himself 
a larger task than simply explaining why people believe in parapsychology: the task of 
explaining why it is irrational to believe in it. Humphrey points out that there is a strange 
paradox at the heart of the parapsychological research programme. On the one hand, 
parapsychologists claim that they are just open-minded scientists trying to account for 
recalcitrant ‘psi-phenomena’. But on the other hand, parapsychologists often show 
themselves already to be convinced that paranormal phenomena must, in John Beloff’s 
words, ‘forever defy scientific analysis’. And therein lies the peculiarity of the approach: 
success in parapsychology amounts to discovering things which cannot be explained! 
 Humphrey is good at teasing out the contradictions and tensions in 
parapsychologists’ claims. He also does a good job of underlining the curious and 
inexplicable banality of the supposed psi-phenomena: why can psychic powers bend 
spoons but not prevent air crashes? Less convincing is his insistence that a belief in an 
immaterial mind requires a commitment to the paranormal. For there are many ways of 
denying materialism—the vague philosophical doctrine that everything is material—
without embracing parapsychology. And it would also be possible to hold (though few 
parapsychologists do) that psi-phenomena will ultimately be explained in terms of 
physical forces and laws. Materialism, then, is irrelevant: the issue is not whether 
parapsychological phenomena are inconsistent with materialism, but whether they are 
inconsistent with the facts, whatever they may be.   
 The right way to approach claims about parapsychological phenomena, it seems 
to me, is David Hume’s. In his essay, ‘Of Miracles’ (1748), Hume argued that given a 
report of a miracle, it is generally more reasonable to believe that someone somewhere is 
deluded than it is to believe that some fundamental law of nature has been disrupted. An 
advantage of this approach is that sceptics do not have to explain how the ‘miracle’ 
occurred, and nor do they have to prove them impossible. Rather, given that there is an 
explanation consistent with the laws of nature (in terms of the credulity of people) the 
apparent miracle can be dismissed. 
 Humphrey is fully behind Hume here. But towards the end of the book, he raises 
the stakes in the argument against parapsychology, and attempts to argue not only that 
parapsychological phenomena are improbable given what we know, but also that they are 
logically impossible. That is, the crucial claim is not that psi-phenomena do not happen: 
it is that they cannot happen. This seems to me to be a mistake. It is one thing to say that 
something cannot happen given what we know about the world; but quite another to say 
that it cannot happen in any sense at all. The fact that we can imagine ESP and the like is 
evidence for the fact that they are possible; and the sceptic should not have to deny this. 
The case against parapsychology is strong enough, as Humphrey’s book shows, without 
its having to establish the absolute impossibility of something which simply does not 
happen. 
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